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Comprehensive digitization leads to new challenges 
because of cybercrime and related security counter-
measures. There is no doubt that this will fundamen-
tally affect our lives and is leading to an increase in 
the importance of information security (IS). However, 
technology solutions alone are not sufficient to ensure 
IS countermeasures. The human side of security is im-
portant to protect organizational assets like user in-
formation and systems. The paper illustrates these re-
lationships in terms of information security awareness 
(ISA), examining its goals and the factors influencing 
it through the systematic analysis and review of scien-
tific literature and the transfer of scientific knowledge 
for practical purposes. We reviewed the publications 




1. Introduction: Overcoming Digitization 
Challenges 
  
Through the cross-sectional nature of information and 
communication technologies (ICT), digitization af-
fects almost all areas of life. Computer-aided tech-
nologization is a key feature of industrialized nations 
and is having an increasing effect on (working) life all 
over the world. The threat potentials are elevated by 
the increasing degree of digital networking, the in-
creasing spread and penetration of information tech-
nology (IT), and a higher degree of interactivity cou-
pled with increasingly high-quality attacks. Previous 
IT security mechanisms have reached their limits, and 
reliability and controllability cannot be assumed as be-
fore [11]. These challenges affect both individuals and 
organizations. Government digital agendas (see the 
                                                 
1  http://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-
lab/dbir/2017/ [accessed May 30, 2017] 
Federal Government of Germany or the Digital 
Agenda for Europe [12]) seek to keep abreast of digital 
networking and the digital changes in society.  
However, information security (IS) is more com-
prehensive than simple IT security [32, 10]. In 2000 IT 
security expert Donald Pipkin addressed all the differ-
ent aspects of IS and saw the value of information as-
sets as a key issue in business [53]. 
Now in its tenth year, Verizon’s 2017 Data Breach 
Investigations Report1 reveals 2,000 data leaks and 
shows who is hit hardest by online spying: about 20 
percent of all successful attacks hit manufacturing 
companies, government agencies, and educational in-
stitutions. The results of a survey on the threat posed 
by ransomware conducted by the Federal Office for 
Information Security (BSI) in Germany in early 2016 
suggest a more severe threat.2 More than a third of the 
institutions interviewed had been affected by encryp-
tion Trojans in the past six months. In 75 percent of 
these cases, the malware sneaked in via infected e-mail 
attachments. For 22 percent, the infection resulted in 
the significant loss of parts of their IT infrastructure.  
In awareness training, in particular, it seems that 
over the past fifteen years organizations have not put 
their main focus on developing IS awareness and train-
ing responsible information users [78]. Verton finds 
that less than 50 percent of organizations have an IT 
security and training program for employees [73]. The 
relevant standard for IT security is 27001 “Information 
Security Management Systems” (ISMS) of the Inter-
national Organization for Standardization (ISO) and 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
[32]. When an ISMS is implemented, it is crucially im-
portant that the information and data protection are 
properly handled and the employees are fully aware of 
the consequences of misusing sensitive data [51]. In 
Germany, ISO/IEC 27001 IT protection certificates 
have been available since 2006 [9]. However, a survey 
2  https://www.heise.de/security/meldung/BSI-Umfrage-Ein-Drit-
tel-der-Unternehmen-ist-von-Erpressungs-Trojanern-betroffen-
3189776.html [accessed May 31, 2017] 





 of 424 German organizations shows that only 63 per-
cent perform measures to raise IS awareness [2] and 
40.5 percent of these organizations do not measure the 
effectiveness of their trainings.  
Technical solutions for IS are necessary to address 
certain vulnerabilities such as viruses, denial of ser-
vice attacks, etc. Nevertheless, IS is about more than 
technology [41], because information systems involve 
human beings, and users do not always act the way 
they are supposed to [3]. Against this backdrop, the 
next section introduces the historical importance of the 
human factor in IS. We end with a summary of our 
research questions and an explanation of the structure 
of the paper. 
 
2. Introduction: Human Actors and IS 
 
A lack of understanding of security issues coupled 
with the pervasive use of computers makes employees 
a “critical factor” in the IS equation [20]. However, as 
Dark points out, knowledgeable human beings are bet-
ter at preventing IS breaches that occur due to negli-
gence or accident as well as those that stem from ma-
licious activity and the anomalous behavior of sys-
tems. They can efficiently and effectively respond to 
incidents by reporting them promptly, quarantining 
problems, and diagnosing and treating these problems 
correctly [20]. Thus, technology solutions alone are 
not sufficient to ensure IS countermeasures. This ad-
dresses the challenges of IS management (ISM) in or-
ganizations, because management and behavioral as-
pects are pivotal to building an ISMS in organizations 
[62]. To protect the organizational assets, including 
user information and systems, the human side of secu-
rity should also be managed [37, 67], as is particularly 
evident in social engineering (SE) attacks [77]. The 
human element plays a significant role in the success-
ful delivery of IS in today’s organizations, and security 
behavior is greatly influenced by employees’ personal 
perceptions of risk. However, these perceptions can be 
changed [6]. 
Solms [74] discusses the development of IS in 
terms of five “waves”: his third (institutional) wave, 
which includes questions about IS policy, brought the 
role of the employee as an end user of the system into 
the spotlight, and the importance of the human dimen-
sion within IS was accepted [74]. This development 
was pushed in the fourth wave with growing emphasis 
on IS Awareness (ISA) and the risk posed by unin-
formed employees, who might compromise IS 
measures. There is one main difference between 
Solms’s fourth (IS governance) and fifth (cybersecuri-
ty) wave: organizations rolled out more and more sys-
tems based on the Internet and its services, making it 
possible for millions of clients and customers to use 
such systems externally without an adequate IS [74]. 
One direct result was that criminals shifted their atten-
tion to the end user under their new motto: “Do not try 
to hack into the company’s IT systems; it may be very 
difficult—go for the naïve end user!” [74]. 
This is why the human factor in IS has often been 
seen as “critical” or the “weakest link” or the “greatest 
threat” in the safety chain, especially because the ma-
jority of incidents of information or data collision in 
organizations are due to unconscious behavior or the 
deliberate fault of employees [7, 21, 23, 27, 72]. How-
ever, in the recent past, a rethink has started highlight-
ing the strength of human actors as a security factor in 
an organization-wide ISMS as well as the need for 
ISA. For example, Elliot emphasized the idea of doing 
security with the organization and not to it [22]. Win-
kler turned against critics who claim that conscious-
ness efforts are useless. She showed how technology, 
process, and awareness should combine to stop human 
failings, and that if a single user action can compro-
mise an entire security program, the problem is the se-
curity program itself [76]. Moreover, one should dif-
ferentiate between the sensitization and training of em-
ployees [8]. “Security communication, education, and 
training (CET) is meant to align employee behavior 
with the security goals of the organization, but it is not 
always designed in a way that can achieve this” [6]. In 
our paper we will come back to this point. What does 
ISA really mean? And how should security CET be 
designed to achieve lasting behavioral change in peo-
ple? The objective of this paper is a systematic compi-
lation of past scientific insights into ISA and a possible 
transfer of these insights into practical implementa-
tion. Our research questions (RQ) are as follows: 
RQ#1: What is ISA actually? What factors are used 
in the scientific literature to define it? How can the cor-
relation to an organizational IS culture be interpreted 
and rules for livable security created? 
RQ#2: What are the dependencies/connections/ 
correlations between these factors and the ISA in prac-
tice? What are the consequences for individual and or-
ganizational learning processes in the area of IS? 
RQ#3: What and how is ISA measured? How is 
ISA related to IS compliance? 
RQ#4: How can ISA trainings (ISAT) be designed 
in practice to be efficient, effective, and sustainable? 
What methods are relevant from a scientific point of 
view?  
In section three we review the relevant scientific 
literature relating to ISA aspects, IS culture, and ISA 
measurements, theories, and trainings. Section four 
summarizes the discussion surrounding our RQ and 
their further ramifications. Our conclusions and future 
work are presented in section five. 
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 3. Literature Review 
  
We reviewed the publications of leading academic 
journals in the area of IS over the past decade. We fo-
cused our research on studies of the “human factor”. 
The purpose was to identify the main research interests 
and to derive impact for practice and future research. 
 
3.1. KAB: knowledge, attitude, behavior 
 
The idea of considering the user as the “weakest link” 
in IS can be found in the large volume of studies that 
try to explain employee adherence to or noncompli-
ance with IS. The concept of ISA is widely used here. 
But at the same time this concept is defined differently 
in the literature. An important step toward a contem-
porary and conceptualized definition of ISA has been 
made through the naming of the three dimensions of 
knowledge, attitude, and behavior—also known as the 
KAB model [40]. The proposition is that ISA comes 
out of what employees or users know about IS and its 
vulnerabilities, what they think or what opinion they 
have about it, and their actual behavior in this context. 
This model has been adopted by other researchers and 
modified [47, 49]. 
In using the KAB model, the question arose as to 
whether knowledge and attitudes are directly con-
nected to behavior or if this influence is only assumed. 
Some authors answered that question with “knowing 
is doing” and filled the knowing-and-doing gap [16, 
47] by showing, on an organization’s management 
level, that managerial ISA and managerial actions to-
ward IS are positively connected. 
A large spectrum of theories has been consulted in 
this research field to obtain knowledge about the real 
security behavior and influencing factors. The theories 
most applied to explain IS behavior are the Theory of 
Planned Behavior, General Deterrence Theory, Com-
pliance Theory, Protection Motivation Theory, the 
Technology Acceptance Model and the Theory of 
Reasoned Action, Social Bond Theory, and Involve-
ment Theory [4; 15; 17; 24; 42; 46; 47; 50; 56; 63; 65; 
68]. 
Our literature review in the field of IS behavior re-
veals that companies’ information security efforts are 
often threatened by employee negligence and insider 
breaches [14]. The lack of ISA, ignorance, negligence, 
apathy, mischief, and resistance are at the root of user 
mistakes [56]. Herath and Rao find that employees un-
derestimate the probability of security breaches [29]. 
The findings of Chu, Chau, and So suggest that misuse 
may be both an intentional type of behavior and an un-
reasoned action [17]. However, the paper by Kruger, 
Drevin, and Steyn indicates that divisions can be iden-
tified where guidance is needed and shows the specific 
types of threats that users are exposed to [41]. And 
Hanamura, Takemura, and Komatsu conclude that the 
ability to collect and process information and ISA de-
crease the probability that an individual will encounter 
information security incidents, but overconfidence re-
garding information security knowledge increases the 
probability of phishing and spoofing [28]. However, 
the constructs of organizational impact and attacker 
assessment generated stronger path coefficients with 
ISA than technical knowledge [46]. Their research 
model results also indicate that ISA is strongly associ-
ated with IS risk [46]. And Pattinson et al. found a 
strong correlation with ISA for the measure relating to 
the three behaviors Internet use, mobile computing, 
and email use [50]. However, Parsons et al. conclude 
that even if there is a reasonable level of ISA overall, 
weaknesses were identified in the use of wireless tech-
nology, the reporting of security incidents, and the use 
of social networking sites [49]. 
In the German banking sector, Bauer and Bernroi-
der find strong empirical evidence showing the im-
portance of ISA programs, protection motivation, and 
monitoring [4], while the findings of Fagade and 
Tryfonas suggest that security by compliance as a 
campaign to secure information assets in Nigerian fi-
nancial institutions is a far-fetched approach [24]. This 
might relate to sociocultural influences on ISA. 
McCrohan, Engel, and Harvey confirm that when us-
ers were educated about the threats to e-commerce and 
trained in proper security practices, their behavior 
could be changed to enhance online security for them-
selves and the firms where they are employed [45].  
While one of the most significant findings of a 
study in Turkey is that the higher the education level, 
the more ISA there is [48], Ngoqo and Flowerday il-
lustrate the poor security behavior among student mo-
bile phone users, despite courses covering certain prin-
ciples relating to information security [47]. The survey 
of Slusky and Partow-Navid revealed that the major 
problem with the ISA of students is not a lack of secu-
rity knowledge but the way that knowledge is applied 
in real-world situations. The authors conclude that the 
compliance with ISA is lower than the understanding 
of it [64]. Kim also showed that college students un-
derstand the importance and the need for ISA training 
(ISAT) but many of them do not participate in train-
ings [37]. Moreover, many student smartphone users 
employ some security measures, but a high percentage 
of them are ignoring potential risks [35]. This suggests 
a need for increased education, training, and aware-




 3.2. Influencing factors / Antecedents 
  
To reduce vulnerability to a variety of attacks, several 
organizations have made ISA a top priority. However, 
Shaw, Chen, and Harris see three main barriers to ISA 
in organizations: the general level of security aware-
ness, employees’ computer skills, and organizational 
budgets [61]. As the reviewed literature shows, an im-
portant influencing factor in IS is not necessarily in-
sufficient knowledge but rather the lack of compliance 
with ISA and IS behavior [64]. Using the vocabulary 
of the KAB model, this is the attitude or the will and 
ability to convert the knowledge into IS-compliant be-
havior. Looking at antecedents of IS compliance, these 
factors can be divided into individual and organiza-
tional levels.  
For example, at the individual level, Flores et al. 
show that computer experience at work, helpfulness, 
and gender had a significant correlation with behavior 
reported by respondents in the scenario-based survey 
[25]. Significant differences between the genders are 
also seen vis-à-vis the intention to comply with data 
protection regulations in German hospitals [26]. The 
general results of Foth suggest that psychological fac-
tors, such as attitude, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavior control, play an important part [26]. The 
findings of Safa, von Solms, and Furnell show that 
commitment and personal norms affect employee atti-
tudes, and that the attitude toward compliance with IS 
organizational policies also has a significant effect on 
the behavioral intention regarding IS compliance [56]. 
At this point, it is important to identify the role of 
top management. The top management can play a pro-
active role in shaping employee compliance behavior 
[31]. Moreover, managers should compartmentalize 
roles and allocate information on a “need to know” ba-
sis [75]. Managers should ensure that employees fully 
understand what behaviors are expected, how their be-
haviors will be evaluated, and what rewards they may 
receive if they perform these behaviors. This 
knowledge can be shared through effective security 
education, training, and awareness initiatives [30]. The 
IT managers could pair new employees with mentors, 
organize group learning exercises, and facilitate on-
the-job training to enhance the practical learning of in-
formation privacy procedures [75]. Formal or informal 
mechanisms can be provided to enhance interaction 
among employees. Frequent interaction is the basis for 
forming interpersonal rapport and psychological at-
tachment [30]. 
Siponen, Pahnila, and Mahmood show that threat 
appraisal, self-efficacy, and response efficacy have a 
significant impact on the intention to comply with IS 
policies, and that sanctions have a significant impact 
on actual compliance with IS policies. The stronger the 
intention to engage in the behavior, the more likely it 
is to be performed [63]. The results of Herath and Rao 
suggest firstly that threat perceptions about the sever-
ity of breaches and response perceptions relating to re-
sponse efficacy, self-efficacy, and response costs are 
likely to affect policy attitudes. Secondly organiza-
tional commitment and social influence have a signif-
icant impact on compliance intentions; and, thirdly, re-
source availability is a significant factor in enhancing 
self-efficacy, which, in turn, is a significant predictor 
of policy compliance intentions [29].  
Boss et al. [7] examine elements of control and 
conclude that the perception of mandatoriness is effec-
tive in motivating individuals to take security precau-
tions, so if individuals believe that management is 
watching, they will comply. In contrast to a previous 
study, Liang, Xue, and Wu reveal that punishment ex-
pectancy is a strong determinant of compliance behav-
ior, while reward expectancy is not significant [43]. In 
line with these findings, Chen, Ramamurthy, and Wen 
indicate that when punishment is severe, adding a re-
munerative control mechanism may not overly affect 
compliance [15].  
By contrast, for Kirlappos, Beautement, and Sasse, 
IS has adapted to the modern collaborative nature of 
organizations and abandoned the “command-and-con-
trol” approaches of the past [38]. The authors state that 
“whilst many organizations are aware that this ‘com-
ply or die’ approach does not work for modern enter-
prises where employees collaborate, share, and show 
initiative, they do not have an alternative approach to 
fostering secure behavior” [38]. Moreover, a clear set 
of IS principles needs to be identified and communi-
cated to develop employees who are risk-aware and 
know how to manage the risks that apply to them [38]. 
Based on the research into IS knowledge sharing [56], 
collaboration, intervention, and experience have a sig-
nificant effect on the attitude of employees toward 
compliance with organizational information security 
policies.  
In addition, the results produced by Sun, Ahlu-
walia, and Koong revealed a nonlinear relationship be-
tween security levels and information security readi-
ness (ISR) [68]. In a general way, ISA programs may 
generate a false sense of security, as taking part in ISA 
programs reduces perceptions of vulnerability, while 
the intentions for compliant security behavior are not 
affected [4].  
However, Tsohou et al. argue that ISA processes 
are associated with interrelated changes that occur at 
the organizational, technological, and individual levels 
[71]. This is also shown by Da Veiga, who found 
firstly that the overall IS culture average scores, as 
well as individual statements, were significantly more 
positive for employees who had read the IS policy 
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 compared with employees who had not, and secondly 
that the overall IS culture also improved from one as-
sessment to the next [19]. 
The summary research results show that a variety 
of nonlinear, complex interactions influence the be-
havior of humans with respect to IS. Likewise, neces-
sary changes in approach in modern organizations are 
clarified. There is a clear need for further work in the 
field of ISA and end-user security behaviors.  
 
3.3. IS Awareness Training (ISAT) 
 
Awareness remains a critical issue of IS [69]. Increas-
ing the level of users’ security awareness through ed-
ucation and training may be an effective way to en-
courage the adoption of security tools, which leads to 
safer technology use [34]. However, the importance of 
appropriate awareness and training is often overlooked 
[44], although scientific research indicates a general 
need for (cyberthreat) education and training [35, 37, 
45, 61]. Furthermore, Tsohou et al. conclude that “re-
cent global security surveys indicate that security 
training and awareness programs are not working” 
[70]. Our review of the scientific literature shows that 
the design of the ISA trainings has not been the subject 
of significant research. Only a few studies from the lit-
erature on KAB give (very general) recommendations 
for the design of training measures [50, 64].  
Why have mainstream ISA techniques failed? One 
aspect might be a “technocratic” view of risk commu-
nication, meaning the tendency for technical experts to 
tell people what they think and ought to know [65]. 
Moreover, it might ignore the daily mix and overlap 
between work and home and therefore ignore an in-
sight from practice that “if you don’t change home se-
curity behavior, it is hugely more difficult to effect 
change in the office” (Ian Kilpatrick, chairman of the 
Wick Hill Group) [13]. A second aspect might be pol-
icies “ending up as long lists of dos and don’ts located 
on web pages most employees only access when they 
have to complete their mandatory annual ‘security 
training’ and which has little to no effect on their se-
curity behavior” [38]. A third aspect relating to IS 
campaigns is that a training with the hope of address-
ing security awareness gaps cannot be sufficient to en-
sure compliance with security culture [24]. Moreover, 
the Dimensional Research Survey showed in 2011 that 
companies were lacking proactive ongoing trainings 
for employees and more than 30 percent did not cur-
rently make any attempt to educate employees [37]. In 
the field of ISA, current information security aware-
ness activities fail [33] and CET approaches are far 
                                                 
3  https://sicherheit.eco.de/2013/events/security-parcours.html [ac-
cessed June 4, 2017] 
from efficient. Nevertheless, Shaw, Chen, and Harris 
[62] report on a laboratory experiment that investi-
gates the impacts of hypermedia, multimedia, and hy-
pertext on increasing ISA on the three awareness lev-
els (perception, comprehension, and projection) in an 
online training environment with meaningful ISA ma-
terials [61].  
The secret is to engage your people in the right 
way, so they can convert learning into tangible action 
and new behavior [6]. Research shows that besides the 
theoretical approach of knowledge transfer and the 
promotional approach of emotionality a systematic 
communicational approach in the form of team-based 
applications is needed to achieve lasting ISA that re-
sults in the intention and behavior to protect confiden-
tial information [36, 54]. The combination of these 
three approaches is called ISAT 3.0 [60]. This corre-
sponds to the idea that ISA is role-based learning, de-
tailing the roles and responsibilities of a user in the use 
of ICT systems within their organization [14] and may 
be based on situational learning as an effective user-
centered approach.  
Besides situational target orientation, ISAT needs 
individual emotionality and team-based communica-
tion and exchange for motivation. To achieve this, cre-
ative techniques and digital and analogue serious 
games become more important in the field of IS, ISA, 
and ISAT. Prime examples of this are the software 
“Operation Digital Chameleon” [55], a card game, 
where the staff members target the topic of SE [5] and 
the “Security Parcours”3 of the company T-Systems 
developed in cooperation with the firm known_sense.  
 
3.4. Measuring awareness 
 
At the very least, the common goal is to achieve a 
change in human behavior to create more IS. How-
ever, most employees will not adopt security behav-
iors that severely hamper their ability to perform pri-
mary tasks [6]. Before mandating a certain security be-
havior, the organization needs to ensure that behavior 
can be complied with, without routinely blocking 
productivity—a step called “security hygiene” [52]. IS 
awareness-raising measures and their evaluation 
should be an indispensable part of today’s organiza-
tions. However, in an international survey with 369 re-
spondents (70 percent from US-based organizations 
and 30 percent from outside the United States) 26.6 
percent indicated that they do not use any metrics to 
measure their awareness program [57]. The most com-
mon methods and their advantages and disadvantages 
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 are summarized and discussed in [58]. But before ap-
propriate measures for assessing the effectiveness of 
IS awareness-raising programs can be chosen, organi-
zations should consider which metrics they want to use 
to monitor the effectiveness of the programs applied 
[58].  
 
3.5. Information security culture 
 
At this point one should also question the relationship 
of ISA to the security culture of the organization. Van 
Niekerk and Solms explain the development of organ-
izational culture at three levels [72]: level one shows 
only the “artifacts.” At level two the “espoused val-
ues” are considered, meaning the organization’s offi-
cial viewpoints, which give a deeper insight into the 
reasons, thoughts, and perceptions that drive the ob-
servable behavior. The third level is called “shared 
tacit assumptions” and reveals those values, beliefs, 
and assumptions that have become shared and taken 
for granted in an organization. These shared tacit as-
sumptions result from a joint learning process [72]. 
Moreover, for Beyer et al. [6] it is necessary to use an 
approach that motivates employees to play an active 
role in corporate security. “Employees should under-
stand what to protect, why they should want to protect 
it, how the organization can help them with this, and 
how successes and mistakes can be used as opportuni-
ties to learn and improve” [6]. 
 
4. Discussion, RQ, and Consequences  
 
RQ#1: Although there is no uniform and binding def-
inition of ISA, many articles in the international scien-
tific literature are based on the KAB model and show 
that knowledge/education about the IS of users is a ba-
sis for reflecting on their own attitudes. The overall 
goal of most literature in this context is a better under-
standing of people’s behavior as a means to develop it 
in the proper way.  
There is, however, no simple linear cause-and-ef-
fect relationship between knowledge and attitudes, and 
certainly not with regard to the real IS behavior prac-
ticed by people. A main problem for human beings 
seems to be the application of IS knowledge in real-
world situations. It seems that commitment and perso-
nal norms affect employees’ attitudes. In addition to 
the proactive role of management, employees them-
selves must decide how to implement IS in their own 
specific work contexts and this needs higher-level ISA 
skills and intention as a motivational factor. Moreover, 
there is no doubt that psychological factors, subjective 
norms, and the sociocultural and gender background 
in nonlinear and complex interactions have a major in-
fluence on human ISA and IS behavior. 
In the context of the practices currently being ex-
amined, rewards and incentives such as remuneration 
rules are hardly ever used as an enforcement mecha-
nism for IS. It is, however, to be expected that the 
“comply or die” approach [38] that has hitherto been 
practiced will work less and less for modern organiza-
tions. 
RQ#2: The improvement of perception and com-
prehension can advance a person’s ability to project 
real-life situations. And it seems that the constructs of 
organizational impact and attacker assessment have a 
stronger influence on the ISA than technical 
knowledge. Management and employees have to learn 
their pivotal role for the IS of an organization.  
Thus, the learning process in organizations must be 
based on the user-centered approach, paying attention 
to target groups, gender, and culture, which is based 
on individual knowledge and skills as well as on con-
crete work connections. The user-centered approach 
should also enable exchange in informal learning pro-
cesses in certain social conditions within the organiza-
tional setting. The integration of formal and informal 
mechanisms can enhance the interaction between em-
ployees. Frequent interaction is the basis for the for-
mation of interpersonal relationships and psychologi-
cal attachment to the organization. Since threat analy-
sis, self-efficacy, and response effectiveness have a 
significant impact on the intention to comply with the 
IS guidelines, such aspects of emotionalization and 
motivation should be incorporated into the sensitiza-
tion to and training of ISA. 
We have developed the spiral of transformative in-
teraction between an organization and its staff with re-
gard to (IS) learning processes (see fig. 1 and [59]). 
The spiral shows the interaction between top-down 
specifications and individual bottom-up influences on 
the establishment of a future-oriented modern organi-
zational security culture.  
RQ#3: With regard to the third complex of re-
search questions, we found that only a few organiza-
tions use different metrics for a deeper and continuous 
measurement of their awareness program [58]. How-
ever, ISAT should be ongoing as the organization 
changes and employees move into and across roles, 
with a focus on what is necessary for their jobs [39]. 
Therefore, ISAT should not overwhelm employees 
with information or take up excessive paid work time 
[72].  
It seems that attitudes toward compliance with IS 
organizational policies also have a significant effect on 
the behavioral intention regarding IS compliance, 
whereby policies must be livable. Here the top man-
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 agement must play a proactive role in shaping employ-
ees’ compliance with IS behavior. Advice should be 
seen as an enabler that supports the organization’s 
goals [6]. 
Creating an effective ISA program requires target-
ed communication and training that caters to specific 
employee groups. The optimal IS culture must be care-
fully defined in each case. If this is not done explicitly, 
staff may conclude that the organization lacks the 
proper commitment to security. Rather than relying on 
generalized computer-based packages, IS training 
should be geared to the specific work environment. 
 
 
Fig 1 Spiral of transformative interaction 
RQ#4: The fourth complex of research questions 
aims to provide concrete instructions for the design of 
the ISAT and useful learning methods. Game-based 
learning is increasingly viewed as an effective method 
for teaching and learning in education. It is especially 
effective as a means to stimulate motivation and 
change behavior and should be explicitly used for ISA. 
In this way, learners directly see the consequences of 
their actions and can get a sense of their knowledge 
level in dialogue. Games also support IS abilities that 
we increasingly need in daily life and in the work-
place—for example, communication, cooperation, so-
cial interaction, and creativity. The emotional level 
should be explicitly addressed, because social partici-
pation in a communicative team process is a key com-
ponent in this third stage of awareness-raising activi-
ties based on psychological theories [60]. Integrated 
analogue and digital game-based ISAT with interac-
tive elements leads to the further involvement of hu-
man actors. Our own extensive experience with such 
learning materials and methods in projects and events 
suggests that ISA and associated knowledge could be 
improved in almost all participants and behavioral 
changes triggered. To this end, we have proposed a fu-
ture project with a correspondingly extensive organi-
zation-oriented measurement scenario, designed for a 
systematic study. 
 
5. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
The extensive research of scientific literature on the 
subject of ISA shows a wide range of studies and spe-
cific theories, mainly taking the point of view that hu-
man actors are the weakest link [44] in IS and geared 
to creating a better understanding of the factors influ-
encing their IS behavior. However, we must overcome 
this misleading perception and realize that employees 
are a strong security and safety barrier, especially in 
the area of SE attacks. For IS “human beings are an 
essential part of the prevention, detection, and re-
sponse cycle” [20]. It is therefore very important to 
provide humans with the knowledge, attitudes, inten-
tion, and skills to behave in a security-oriented way 
and build up ISA. The need for more intensive ISAT 
is postulated from the research, but ways of making 
such trainings effective and sustainable are not really 
addressed.  
Studies show that frequently used awareness-rais-
ing and training measures, such as campaigns (e.g., 
flyers, brochures, posters, films), purely IT-based 
trainings (e.g., web-based trainings, simple video 
games), or the sharing of information in lectures, are 
ineffective and do not lead to a lasting sense of secu-
rity among the addressees [1, 18, 66]. Instead, training 
that provides opportunities for personal communica-
tion and interaction is a promising means to promote 
ISA and the triggering of security-related behavior. To 
be effective, security training must be based in the 
work context and address specific security needs, with 
regular ongoing reminders of the key messages and 
awareness campaigns tailored to employees’ needs 
[6]. As a result, the acceptance of the corresponding 
technical, organizational, individual, and administra-
tive measures may also increase [1]. But there is no 
shortcut to developing an effective ISAT program, be-
cause every organization must define for itself the se-
curity culture it seeks to promote [6]. 
Much of the research on ISA is about staff and stu-
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 dents at the university level, with a certain amount fo-
cusing on company employees. There are few e-gov-
ernment studies, although public administrations have 
electronically processed sensitive and critical infor-
mation for decades. In order to overcome this limita-
tion, we are particularly keen to stimulate projects in 
this area. More research in the nonlinear and complex 




[1] Albrechtsen, E., “A Qualitative Study of Users’ View on 
Information Security”, Computers & Security, Vol. 26, No. 4, 
2007, pp. 276–289. 
[2] Allianz für Cyber-Sicherheit/Alliance for Cyber Security, 
Awareness-Umfrage 2015. 
[3] Aytes, K., and C. Terry, “Computer security and risky 
computing practices: a rational choice perspective”, Journal of 
Organizational and End User Computing, Vol. 16, No. 3, 
2004, pp. 22–40. 
[4] Bauer S., and E. W. Bernroider, “The Effects of Awareness 
Programs on Information Security in Banks: The Roles of Pro-
tection Motivation and Monitoring”, in T. Tryfonas, and I. 
Askoxylakis (eds.), Human Aspects of Information Security, 
Privacy, and Trust, HAS 2015, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Vol. 9190, Springer, Cham, 2015, pp. 154–164. 
[5] Beckers, K., and S. Pape, “A serious game for eliciting so-
cial engineering security requirements”, Requirements Engi-
neering Conference, 2016, pp. 15–25.  
[6] Beyer, M., S. Ahmed, K. Doerlemann, S. Arnell, S. Parkin, 
A. Sasse, and N. Passingham, Awareness is only the first 
step: A framework for progressive engagement of staff in cyber 
security, Hewlett Packard, Business white paper, 2016. 
[7] Boss, R.S., L.J. Kirsch, I. Angermeier, R.A Shingler, and 
R.W. Boss, “If someone is watching, I’ll do what I’m asked: 
Mandatoriness, control, and information security”, European 
Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2009, pp. 151–
164. 
[8] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) 
(Federal Office for Information Security), ORP.3: Sensibilisie-
rung und Schulung, 2016.  
[9] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) 
(Federal Office for Information Security), Self-Declaration and 
IT-Grundschutz Certificate, 2016.  
[10] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik 
(BSI) (Federal Office for Security in Information Technology), 
BSI-Standards 200-1. Managementsysteme für Infor-
mationssicherheit (ISMS). Community Draft – Version, 2017. 
[11] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik 
(BSI) (Federal Office for Information Security), “Knowing 
risks, accepting challenges, designing solutions: Preface”, Con-
ference Proceedings of the 14th German IT Security Confer-
ence, Bonn, Bad Godesberg, 2015. 
[12] Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) 
(Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy), International Di-
mension: EU – Digital Agenda, 2014. 
[13] Caldwell, T., “Making security awareness training work”, 
Computer Fraud & Security, Vol. 6, 2016, pp. 8–14. 
[14] Chen, C.C., B.D. Medlin, and R.S. Shaw, “A cross-cul-
tural investigation of situational information security aware-
ness programs”, Information Management & Computer Secu-
rity, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2008, pp. 360–376. 
[15] Chen, Y., K. Ramamurthy, and K.-W. Wen, “Information 
Security Policy Compliance: Stick or Carrot Approach?”, 
Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol. 29, No. 3, 
2014, pp. 157–188.  
[16] Choi, N., D. Kim, J. Goo, and A. Whitmore, “Knowing is 
doing: An empirical validation of the relationship between 
managerial information security awareness and action”, Infor-
mation Management & Computer Security, Vol. 16, No. 5, 
2008, pp. 484–501.  
[17] Chu, A., P. Chau, and M. So, “Explaining the misuse of 
information systems resources in the workplace: A dual-pro-
cess approach”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 131, No. 1, 
2015, pp. 209–225. 
[18] Cone, B.D., C.E. Irvine, M.F. Thompson, and T.D. Ngu-
yen, “A Video Game for Cyber Security Training and Aware-
ness”, Computers & Security, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2007, pp. 63–72. 
[19] Da Veiga, A., “Comparing the information security cul-
ture of employees who had read the information security policy 
and those who had not: Illustrated through an empirical study”, 
Information & Computer Security, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2016, pp. 
139–151.  
[20] Dark, M.J., “Security Education, Training and Awareness 
from a Human Performance Technology Point of View”, in 
M.E. Whitman, and H.J. Mattord (eds.), Readings and Cases in 
Management of Information Security, Course Technology, Ma-
son, 2006, pp. 86–104. 
[21] DSV-Gruppe, EnBW, <kes>, known_sense, nextsolutions, 
and Pallas (eds.), Entsicherung am Arbeitsplatz: Die geheime 
Logik der IT-Security in Unternehmen, Cologne, Munich, 
2006. 
[22] Elliot, J., “How to Do Security WITH Your Organisation, 
Not TO It” (Video), RSA Conference, 2017. 
[23] EnBW, known_sense, Pallas, SAP, Sonicwall, Steria 
Mummert Consulting, and Trend Micro (eds.), Aus der Abwehr 
in den Beichtstuhl: Qualitative Wirkungsanalyse, CISO & Co., 
Cologne, 2008. 
[24] Fagade, T., and T. Tryfonas, “Security by Compliance? A 
Study of Insider Threat Implications for Nigerian Banks”, in T. 
Tryfonas (ed.), Human Aspects of Information Security, Pri-
vacy, and Trust, HAS 2016, Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, Vol. 9750, Springer, Cham, 2016, pp. 128–139. 
[25] Flores, W.R., H. Holm, G. Svensson, and G. Ericsson, 
“Using phishing experiments and scenario-based surveys to 
understand security behaviours in practice”, Information Man-
agement & Computer Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2014, pp. 393–
406.  
[26] Foth, M., “Factors influencing the intention to comply 
Page 2242
 with data protection regulations in hospitals: Based on gender 
differences in behaviour and deterrence”, European Journal of 
Information Systems, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2016, pp. 91–109. 
[27] Guo, K., Y. Yuan, N.P. Archer, and C.E. Connelly, “Un-
derstanding Nonmalicious Security Violations in the Work-
place: A Composite Behavior Model”, Journal of Management 
Information System, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2011, pp. 203–236.  
[28] Hanamura, K.I., T. Takemura, and A. Komatsu, “Re-
search Note: Analysis of the Characteristics of Victims in In-
formation Security Incident Damages; The Case of Japanese 
Internet Users”, The Review of Socionetwork Strategies, Vol. 
7, No. 1, 2013, pp. 43–51. 
[29] Herath, T., and H.R. Rao, “Encouraging information secu-
rity behaviors in organizations: Role of penalties, pressures and 
perceived effectiveness”, Decision Support Systems, Vol. 47, 
No. 2, 2009, pp. 154–165.  
[30] Hsu, J.S.-C., S.-P. Shih, Y.W. Hung, and P.B. Lowry, 
“The Role of Extra-Role Behaviors and Social Controls in In-
formation Security Policy Effectiveness”, Information Systems 
Research, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2015, pp. 282–300.  
[31] Hu, Q., T. Dinev, P. Hart, and D. Cooke, “Managing em-
ployee compliance with information security policies: The crit-
ical role of top management and organizational culture”, Deci-
sion Sciences, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2012, pp. 615–660. 
[32] International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Sur-
vey, The ISO Survey of Management System Standard Certifi-
cations (2006–2015): ISO/IEC 27001 – Information Technol-
ogy – Information Security Management Systems – Require-
ments, ISO/IEC 27001:2013/Cor 2:2015, 2015. 
[33] ISF (Information Security Forum), From Promoting 
Awareness to Embedding Behaviors: Secure by Choice Not by 
Chance, 2014. 
[34] James, T., Q. Nottingham, and B.C. Kim, “Determining 
the antecedents of digital security practices in the general pub-
lic dimension”, Information Technology and Management, 
Vol. 14, No. 2, 2013, pp. 69–89. 
[35] Jones, B.H., A.G. Chin, and P. Aiken, “Risky business: 
Students and smartphones”, Tech Trends, Vol. 58, No. 6, 2014, 
pp. 73–83. 
[36] Khan, B., K.S. Alghathbar, S.I. Nabi, and M.K. Khan, 
“Effectiveness of information security awareness methods 
based on psychological theories”, African Journal of Business 
Management, Vol. 5, No. 26, 2011, pp. 10862–10868. 
[37] Kim, E.B., “Recommendations for information security 
awareness training for college students”, Information Manage-
ment & Computer Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2014, pp. 115–126.  
[38] Kirlappos I., A. Beautement, and M.A. Sasse, “‘Comply 
or Die’ Is Dead: Long Live Security-Aware Principal Agents”, 
in A.A. Adams, M. Brenner, and M. Smith (eds.), Financial 
Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2013, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, Vol. 7862, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 
2013, pp. 70–82.  
[39] Kirlappos, I., S. Parkin, and M.A. Sasse, “Learning from 
‘Shadow Security’: Why understanding non-compliance pro-
vides the basis for effective security”, (Proceedings) Workshop 
on Usable Security (USEC), San Diego, CA, USA, 2014. 
[40] Kruger, H.A., and W.D. Kearney, “A prototype for as-
sessing information security awareness”, Computers & Secu-
rity, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2006, pp. 289–296.  
[41] Kruger H., L. Drevin, and T. Steyn, “Email Security 
Awareness: A Practical Assessment of Employee Behaviour”, 
in L. Futcher, and R. Dodge (eds.), Fifth World Conference on 
Information Security Education. IFIP – International Federa-
tion for Information Processing, Vol. 237, Springer, Boston, 
MA, 2007, pp. 33–40. 
[42] Lebek, B., J. Uffen, M. Neumann, B. Hohler, and M.H. 
Breitner, “Information security awareness and behavior: A the-
ory-based literature review”, Management Research Review, 
Vol. 37, No. 12, 2014, pp. 1049–1092.  
[43] Liang, H., Y. Xue, and L. Wu, “Ensuring Employees’ IT 
Compliance: Carrot or Stick?”, Information Systems Research, 
Vol. 24, No. 2, 2013, pp. 279–294.  
[44] Manifavas, C., K. Fysarakis, K. Rantos, and G. Hatzivasi-
lis, “DSAPE – Dynamic Security Awareness Program Evalua-
tion”, in T. Tryfonas, and I. Askoxylakis (eds.), Human As-
pects of Information Security, Privacy, and Trust, HAS 2014, 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 8533, Springer, 
Cham, 2014, pp. 258–269. 
[45] McCrohan, K.F., K. Engel, and J.W. Harvey, “Influence 
of Awareness and Training on Cyber Security”, Journal of In-
ternet Commerce, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2010, pp. 23–41.  
[46] Mejias, R.J., and P.A. Balthazard, “A Model of Infor-
mation Security Awareness for Assessing Information Security 
Risk for Emerging Technologies”, Journal of Information Pri-
vacy and Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2014, pp. 160–185.  
[47] Ngoqo, B., and S.V. Flowerday, “Exploring the relation-
ship between student mobile information security awareness 
and behavioural intent”, Information & Computer Security, 
Vol. 23, No. 4, 2015, pp. 406–420.  
[48] Öğütçü, G., Ö.M. Testik, and O. Chouseinoglou, “Analy-
sis of personal information security behavior and awareness”, 
Computers & Security, Vol. 56, 2016, pp. 83–93. 
[49] Parsons, K., A. McCormac, M. Pattinson, M. Butavicius, 
and C. Jerram, “A study of information security awareness in 
Australian government organisations”, Information Manage-
ment & Computer Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2014, pp. 334–345.  
[50] Pattinson, M., K. Parsons, M. Butavicius, A. McCormac, 
and D. Calic, “Assessing information security attitudes: A 
comparison of two studies”, Information & Computer Security, 
Vol. 24, No. 2, 2016, pp. 228–240.  
[51] PCI Security Standards Council, Security Awareness Pro-
gram Special Interest Group, PCI Data Security Standard 
(PCI DSS), Version 1.0, 2014. 
[52] Pfleeger, S.L., M.A. Sasse, and A. Furnham, “From 
Weakest Link to Security Hero: Transforming Staff Security 
Behavior”, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2014, pp. 489–510. 
[53] Pipkin, D.L., Information Security: Protecting the Global 
Enterprise, Prentice-Hall Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2000. 
[54] Pokoyski, D., “Security Awareness: Von der Oldschool in 
die Next Generation; Eine Einführung”, in M. Helisch, and D. 
Page 2243
 Pokoyski (eds.), Security Awareness. Neue Wege zur erfolgrei-
chen Mitarbeiter-Sensibilisierung, Vieweg+Teubner, Wiesba-
den, 2009, pp. 1–8. 
[55] Rudel, S., and A. Rieb, “Technik vs. Mensch: Was nutzt 
ein hoher technischer Standard, wenn die Schwachstelle 
Mensch umgangen wird?”, in Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik (BSI), Digitale Gesellschaft zwischen Ri-
sikobereitschaft und Sicherheitsbedürfnis, Tagungsband zum 
15. Deutschen IT-Sicherheitskongress, 2017, pp. 345–352. 
[56] Safa, N.S., R. von Solms, and S. Furnell, “Information se-
curity policy compliance model in organizations”, Computers 
& Security, Vol. 56, 2016, pp. 70–82. 
[57] SANS Securing the Human, Security Awareness Report: 
Awareness Is Hard: A Tale of Two Challenges, 2016. 
[58] Scholl, M., K. Leiner, and F. Fuhrmann, “Blind spot: Do 
you know the effectiveness of your information security 
awareness-raising program?”, Proceedings of the 21st World 
Multi-Conference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics 
(WMSCI 2017), pp. 361–366. 
[59] Scholl, M., and F. Fuhrmann, “Analog – digital? Wie sich 
mithilfe analoger Methoden Bewusstsein für Informationssi-
cherheit in der digitalen Welt fördern lässt”, in D. Rätz, M. 
Breidung, D. Lück-Schneider, S. Kaiser, and E. Schweighofer 
(eds.), Digitale Transformation: Methoden, Kompetenzen und 
Technologien für die Verwaltung, Lecture Notes in Informatics 
(LN), Vol. 261, 2016, pp. 101–112. 
[60] Scholl, M., F. Fuhrmann, and D. Pokoyski, “Information 
Security Awareness 3.0 for Job Beginners”, in J. E. Varajão, 
M.M. Cruz-Cunha, R. Martinho, R. Rijo, N. Bjørn-Andersen, 
R. Turner, and D. Alves (eds.), Conference on ENTERprise In-
formation Systems (CENTERIS), 2016, pp. 433–436. 
[61] Shaw, R.S., C.C. Chen, and A.L. Harris, “The impact of 
information richness on information security awareness train-
ing effectiveness”, Computers & Education, Vol. 52, No. 1, 
2009, pp. 92–100. 
[62] Singh, A.N., A. Picot, J. Kranz, M.P. Cupta, and A. Ojha, 
“Information security management (ism) practices: Lessons 
from select cases from India and Germany”, Global Journal of 
Flexible Systems Management, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2013, pp. 225–
239.  
[63] Siponen, M., S. Pahnila, and A. Mahmood, “Employees’ 
adherence to information security policies: An empirical 
study”, in H. Venter, M. Eloff, L. Labuschagne, J. Eloff, and 
R. von Solms (eds.), New Approaches for Security, Privacy 
and Trust in Complex Environments, IFIP International Infor-
mation Security Conference, 232, Springer, Boston, 2007, pp. 
133–144. 
[64] Slusky, L., and P. Partow-Navid, “Students Information 
Security Practices and Awareness”, Journal of Information 
Privacy and Security, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2012, pp. 3–26.  
[65] Stewart, G., and D. Lacey, “Death by a thousand facts: 
Criticising the technocratic approach to information security 
awareness”, Information Management & Computer Security, 
Vol. 20, No. 1, 2012, pp. 29–38.  
[66] Straub, D.W., and R.J. Welke, “Coping with Systems 
Risk: Security Planning Models for Management Decision 
Making”, MIS Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1998, pp. 441–469.  
[67] Styles M., “Constructing Positive Influences for User Se-
curity Decisions to Counter Corporate or State Sponsored 
Computer Espionage Threats”, in L. Marinos and I. Askox-
ylakis (eds.), Human Aspects of Information Security, Privacy, 
and Trust, HAS 2013, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
Vol. 8030, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013, pp. 197–206.  
[68] Sun, J., P. Ahluwalia, and K.S. Koong, “The more secure 
the better? A study of information security readiness”, Indus-
trial Management & Data Systems, Vol. 111, No. 4, 2011, pp. 
570–588.  
[69] Tsohou A., M. Karyda, S. Kokolakis, and E. Kiountouzi, 
“Analyzing Information Security Awareness through Networks 
of Association”, in S. Katsikas, J. Lopez, and M. Soriano 
(eds.), Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business, Trust-
Bus 2010, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6264, 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 227–237. 
[70] Tsohou, A., M. Karyda, S. Kokalakis, and E. Kiountouzi, 
“Analyzing trajectories of information security awareness”, In-
formation Technology & People, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2012, pp. 
327–352. 
[71] Tsohou, A., M. Karyda, S. Kokalakis, and E. Kiountouzi, 
“Managing the introduction of information security awareness 
programmes in organisations”, European Journal of Infor-
mation Systems, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2015, pp. 38–58.  
[72] Van Niekerk, J.F., and R. von Solms, “Information secu-
rity culture: A management perspective”, Computers & Secu-
rity, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2010, pp. 476–486.  
[73] Verton, D., The Hacker Diaries, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New 
York, 2002. 
[74] Von Solms, S.H., “The 5 Waves of Information Security: 
From Kristian Beckman to the Present”, in K. Rannenberg, V. 
Varadharajan, and C. Weber (eds.), SEC 2010, IFIP Interna-
tional Federation for Information Processing AICT 330, 2010, 
pp. 1–8. 
[75] Warkentin, M., A.C. Johnston, and J. Shropshire, “The in-
fluence of the informal social learning environment on infor-
mation privacy policy compliance efficacy and intention”, Eu-
ropean Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2011, 
pp. 267–284. 
[76] Winkler, I., “The Human Exploitation Kill Chain” (Video), 
RSA Conference, 2017. 
[77] Workman, M., “Gaining Access with Social Engineering: 
An Empirical Study of the Threat”, Information Systems Secu-
rity, Vol. 16, No. 6, 2007, pp. 315–331. 
[78] Young, R. “Growth Perspective of Information Security”, 
Journal of Information Privacy and Security, Vol. 5, No. 4, 
2014, pp. 51–67. 
Page 2244
